You’re reading our view, and it’s one of two perspectives in today’s debate. For the opposing point of view, read “The US Capitol Police On January 6th Didn’t Fail.” The top three security officials at the US Capitol building when insurgent rioters breached Building 6, the vote count halted by Congress, since then has been heavily criticized. They did nothing to help themselves on Tuesday while testifying before the joint committees in the Senate to investigate what went wrong. All three men – former Capitol Police Chief Stephen Sound, former House Sgt. Paul Irving and former Senate Sergeant. Michael Stinger – He resigned or was asked to resign soon after the riots. On Tuesday, they contradicted each other in a self-serving manner, acknowledging how critical information predicting violence had been lost in departmental bureaucracy, and described a fossilized chain of command in which the main decision is made under combat conditions forever consumed. Senate testimonies contested that their deadly clumsy performance is another reason why a Congressional committee like 9/11 is necessary to fully examine the events of that crucial day. Just some of the unfortunate cases described on Tuesday include: intel. Sund said his agency, the US Capitol Police, appropriately planned the limited violence they expected. But he also acknowledged that the day before the building was breached, an FBI report arrived with his agency, warning that extremists bent on war with the government were heading to Washington, D.C., but the report never reached Sund. The former president told senators the matter did not go beyond a censor in his intelligence office. Two days before the riots, Sund said, he had sought permission to bring in the National Guard to help with security. Irving turned it down, fearing the “optics” of the soldiers on Capitol Hill. In his testimony on Tuesday, Irving denied all of this, saying that there was no reference to the optics, and that Sund never requested troops, but only discussed with Irving and Stinger the idea of using National Guard soldiers – something the three agreed was not necessary. . ► Conflicting stories. On the day of the riot, as Capitol police defenses were collapsing under the rioters’ attack, Sund said he called Irving at 1:09 p.m. – Sunde repeated that set time Tuesday – asking that he be allowed to call in the National Guard to help with the defense. Building. At the height of the attack, Sund said it took an hour before permission was obtained. But Irving categorically contradicted Tuesday, saying he didn’t hear from the president until 1:28 p.m. – and even then it was just a suggestion that it was worth calling the guard. This reaction was not limited to these three men only. Robert Conte, the acting chief of police in Washington, DC, testified Tuesday about an emergency phone conference he participated in with Sund, in which the military was asked about sending troops. “ Stunned when answered. ” Conte said the call was at 2:22 p.m. minutes after rioters stormed the building, and Sunde was calling for help. Rather than agreeing to the request right away, Conte said, Army officials began asking questions about the overall plan and how the presence of soldiers would be on Capitol Hill. “I was just shocked by the response,” Conte testified. It would take more than three hours before the National Guard arrived. The violence that day left five dead and temporarily halted the constitutional vote count. At least 200 rioters have since been indicted. The looting of the Capitol by American citizens is a stain on our democracy. It is imperative to know how this could happen, what was missed, and where stupid mistakes contributed to a massive security failure.